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New Brunswick and Offshore Mineral Rights 
Frank J. McKenna t 
Part 1: The Legal Basis of New Brunswick’s Claim
On April 26, 1965, the Governor in Council terminated years 
of inconclusive bargaining by submitting to the Supreme Court of 
Canada a detailed reference1 on the question of ownership on off­
shore minerals2.
1. In respect of the lands, including the mineral and other na­
tural resources, of the sea bed and subsoil seaward from the or­
dinary low-water mark, of the coast of the mainland and the sev­
eral islands of British Columbia, outside the harbours, bays, es­
tuaries and other similar inland waters, to the outer limit of the 
territorial sea of Canada, as defined in the Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zones Act, Statutes of Canada 1964, Chapter 22, as be­
tween Canada and British Columbia,
(a) Are the said lands the property3 of Canada or British Col­
umbia?
(b) Has Canada or British Columbia the right to explore and 
exploit the said lands?
(c) Has Canada or British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in re­
lation to the said lands?
2. In respect of the mineral and other natural resources of the 
sea bed and subsoil beyond that part of the territorial sea of Can­
ada referred to in Question 1, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond 
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the mineral and other natural resources of 
the said areas, as between Canada and British Columbia,
(a) Has Canada or British Columbia the right to explore and 
exploit the said mineral and other natural resources?
(b) Has Canada or British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in re­
lation to the said mineral and other natural resources?
Although the principal litigants were British Columbia and 
the federal government, all provincial governments had a “special 
interest” in the result and four made submissions buttressing the 
British Columbia argument.
t Second Year Law Student, The University of New Brunswick
1. As provided for in the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. S-19 s. 55 (1) (d).
2. Order in Council, P.C. 1965 - 750, April 26, 1965.
3. Technically, the correct term should be “the beneficial in­
terest in property”. For a detailed discussion of this con­
cept, reference should be made to the factum of the Pro­
vince of New Brunswick, p. 5.
4. Reference Re Ownership of O ffshore M ineral Rights (1968) 
65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 at pp. 380-81.
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The Supreme Court delivered its opinion on November 7,
1967 and the federal position prevailed on both questions.4 Des­
pite this seemingly conclusive disposition of the issue, other Can­
adian jurisdictions, including New Brunswick, have continued to 
exert their claim without visible reticence.5
It is submitted that the pivotal question6 in the British Col­
umbia Reference was whether the territory in question fell within 
the umbrella of British Columbia’s boundaries prior to the admis­
sion of that province to the Canadian federation in 1871. In the 
court’s own words:
. . .  But it leaves untouched the problem that we have to face -
whether the territorial sea was within the boundary of the Pro­
vince of British Columbia at the time of Confederation.7
Implicit in the court’s reasoning throughout was the proposi­
tion that if the Province of British Columbia could establish pre- 
1871 jurisdiction over the disputed locus a legitimate legal claim 
might exist.8
In effect, the entire ratio decidendi of the British Colum­
bia reference was confined to bringing the area in dispute under 
federal jurisdiction on the assumption that British Columbia had 
failed to demonstrate a credible historical claim. If this reasoning 
is legitimate, ex hypothesi, the door has been left open for New 
Brunswick and other Canadian provinces to exert legal claims bas­
ed on their respective historical backgrounds.9
To present a completely comprehensive assessment of New 
Brunswick’s rights with respect to off-shore mineral resources, 
four distinct, compartmentalized areas will be discussed, each of 
which has its own unique historical background.
5. See for example the H alifax Chronicle Herald, Editorial, 
October 6, 1971.
6. S e for example Neil Kaplan, Legal Issues of the Offshore  
M ineral Rights D ispute in Canada (1968), 14 McGill Law 
Journal 475 at p. 492 and G. V. La Forest, N atural R e­
sources and Public P roperty, (1969), p. 100.
7. (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 at p. 360.
8. Id., at p. 367.
9. For example in a letter from the Deputy Attorney Gener­
al of Nova Scotia to the author dated July 10, 1972. Nova 
Scotia’s legal case was described as premised upon histor­
ica l arguments:. . .  the Supreme Court found that the Prov­
ince of British Columbia had no ownership or property 
right in the territorial sea at the time it entered into Con­
federation and had not acquired any ownership or property 
right at the time of the reference. The historical situation 
was quite different in the case of the Province of Nova 
Scotia. . .
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A. The solum between the ordinary10 high water mark and the
low water mark.
To a province that boasts the highest tides in the world, this 
locus in quo is by no means inconsiderable. In a preconfederation 
case11, Carter C. J. characterized “beach” or “shoal dry at low 
water” as seashore and applied Lord Hale’s theory that ownership 
was vested in the King. A fortiori, by virtue of Section 109 of the 
British North America Act12, this property held by the King, in 
right of colony, became property held by the King in right of Prov­
ince. The property interest may be alienated by the Legislature, 
but to do so requires an explicit conveyance.13 A summary per­
usal of coastline abutting mineral leases granted in New Bruns­
wick prior to Confederation reveals no such instances.14 Further­
more, New Brunswick has a number of statutes expressly reserv­
ing property rights in minera's.15
In summary, the crown in right of province has ownership in 
the solum between ordinary high water and low water, unless ex­
pressly conveyed, and even when such alienation has taken place, 
specific minerals have been reserved.
B. Inland waters.
Inland waters have been variously defined as “those parts of 
the sea which are neither high seas nor territorial waters but lie 
to the inland side of the base line from which the territorial sea is 
measured,10 and, “a State’s ports and harbours, bays and gulfs, 
land locked seas, lakes, straits and rivers”.17
It should be noted that the category “inland waters” includes 
considerably more than landlocked waters. Its significance in the 
context of offshore minerals is derived from the fact that it sub­
sumes a number of specific waters adjacent to the New Bruns­
wick coast. These “adjacent inland waters” include several bodies 
of water included in New Brunswick’s boundaries at Confedera­
10. It was established by Lord Hale in D e Jure M aris that the 
ordinary, as opposed to extraordinary tide level, should be 
the measuring mark. This measure seems to have enjoyed 
widespread acceptance.
11. D oe d. Fry v H ill (1853), 7 N.B.R. 587
12. 30-31 Viet. (1867), c. 3.
13. Lee v A rthurs (1919), 46 N.B.R. 482 at p. 488.
14. Documents of the New Brunswick Archives.
15. See for example Mining Act R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 146, s.8 
(3 & 4) as amended by S.N.B. 1954, c. 60, s.4, and, An Act 
Respecting the Ownership of Minerals, S.N.B. 1953, c. 10, 
s. 2.
16. O’Connell, International Law  2nd ed. (1970) (vol. I) p. 483.
17. Higgins, The International L aw  of the Sea, 5th Rev. ed. 
(1962), p. 158.
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tion and a number of waters not clearly defined within provincial 
boundaries but over which New Brunswick has exercised prescrip­
tive jurisdiction. A combination of New Brunswick history and 
the Canadian constitution give this province a strong legal claim 
with respect to a large body of territory falling within this cate­
gory.
A brief constitutional survey reveals that by virtue of section 
117 and 109, limited only by the expressly scheduled enumeration 
to section 108, inland waters held by the Crown in right of colony 
at confederation were held by Crown in right of province after 
Confederation18
117 The several provinces shall retain all their respective Pub­
lic Property not otherwise disposed of in this Act, subject 
to the right of Canada to assume any lands or Public Prop­
erty for Fortifications or for the Defense of the Country.
109 All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalities belonging to 
the Several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New  
Brunswick at the Union, and all Sums then due or payable 
for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong 
to the Several Provinces o f Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, 
and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, 
subject to any trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any 
Interest other than that of the Province in the same.
108 The public works and Property of each Province enumerat­




These constitutional provisions need be marshalled only with 
respect to a particular category of inland waters - those adjacent 
to the coast. The remaining inland waters, those landlocked, are 
clearly within the jurisdiction of New Brunswick by virtue of Sec­
tion 7 of the British North America Act, majus continet minus.
Tho provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall have the
same limits as at the passing of this act.19
The fact that the solum of inland waters was the property of 
the Crown in right of province was conclusively demonstrated in 
Rc Provincial Fisheries20 and that this property right extended to 
the bed of adjacent waters intra fauces terrae was established by 
Duff J. in Capital City Canning Company v Anglo Packing Com­
pany.
18. 30-31 Viet (1867), c. 3.
19. Ibid.
20. (1895), 26 S.C.R. 444.
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It was not disputed and I assume for the purpose of this appli­
cation that this site is intra fauces terrae. The bed of the sea in 
such places is part of the territorial possessions of the Crown and
—  except in the case of public harbour, within the disposition of 
the Provincial Legislature.. .21
New Brunswick was formally created on June 18, 1784, when 
Letters Patent were issued containing the following description:
The tract of Country bounded by the Gulph of St. LawTence on 
the East, the Province of Quebec on the North; the Territories of 
the United States on the West, and the Bay of Fundy on the 
South; should be erected into a Government under the Name of 
New Brunswick.22
Subsequently, in 1786, a more elaborate description was ex­
pressed in the Royal Commission to Sir Thomas Carleton:
Our Province of New Brunswick bounded on the westward by 
the Mouth of the River Saint Croix by the said River to its 
Source and by a Line drawn due North from thence to the South­
ern Boundary of our province of Quebec to the Northward by the 
said boundary as far as the Western Extremity of the Bay des 
Chaleurs to the Eastward by the said Bay and the Gulph of Saint 
Lawrence to the Bay called Bay Verte to the South by a line in 
the center of the Bay of Fundy from the River Saint Croix afore­
said to the Mouth of the Musquat River by the said River to its 
source, and from thence by a due East line across the Isthmus 
into the Bay Verte to join the Eastern line above described in­
cluding all islands within six Leagues of the Coast with all the 
Rights, Members and Appurtenances whatsoever thereunto be­
longing.23
A final revision, significant to the issue in question took place 
in 1871, when by Imperial Statute the Northern boundary of New 
Brunswick was conclusively settled:
Thence down the centre of the stream of the Restigouche to its 
mouth in the Bay of Chaleurs; and thence through the middle of 
that Bay to the Gulf of St. Lawrence; the islands in the said 
Rivers Mistouche and Restigouche to the mouth of the latter river 
at Dalhousie being given to New Brunswick.24
Two decisions, one of the New Brunswick Supreme Court 
and one of the Supreme Court of Canada established that bodies 
of water, expressly included within the provincial boundaries pre­
viously described, were subject to provincial jurisdiction. The for­
mer decision, R v Burt,-S was concerned with the Bay of Fundy 
while the latter, Mowat v Mcfee,2n dealt with the Bay of Chaleurs.
21. (1905), 11 B.C.R. 333 at p 339.
22. R.S.N.B. 1952, Appendix, Vol. 4, p. 5.
23. Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, No.
6, 394.
24. 44-45 Viet. (1851), c. 3.
25. (1932), 5 M.P.R. 112.
26. (1880), 5 S.C.R. 17.
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Despite the seemingly conclusive boundary delimitation and 
the R v Burt decision, the exact status of the Bay of Fundy is still 
in doubt.27
A respected source, Gerard La Forest, makes extensive 
claims with respect to the adjacent inland waters of the provinces 
at Confederation; these claims are based upon historical prescrip­
tion and universal international law rights.28
Hovering statutes passed by all three Maritime provinces-’1' 
provide some support for La Forest’s theory that all bays:i0 in the 
Maritimes are “historic territorial” . New Brunswick’s legislation 
authorized customs and excise officers to board any ship within 
three miles of the coast or within any port or bay. This legisla­
tion was subsequently affirmed by British Order In Council.31
Furthermore, by convention in 1818^- and by a statute pass­
ed in 18 1 933, to give effect to the convention. Great Britain exert­
ed a pre-emptive claim to fishing within three miles of the “coasts, 
bays, creeks or harbours” . As stated by the Privy Council, “No 
stronger assertion of exclusive Dominion over the bay could well 
be framed.”34
At common law, a bay was considered territorial if one side 
could be seen from the other with the naked eye.35 In Interna­
tional Law, as a minimum criteria, a bay of not more than six 
miles36 in width was considered an inland water.37
27. The status of the Bay of Fundy and the implications of 
the R v Burt decision are discussed in detail under the 
Territorial Waters section.
28. La Forest, Natural Resources and Public Property under 
the Canadian Constitution, 1969, p. 90. See also La For­
est. Canadian Inland Waters, C.Y.I.L. [1963], 149 at p. 159.
29. 6 Wm. IV, c. 8.; 6 Viet., c. 14; 16 Viet., c. 69.
30. 16 Viet., c. 39. See also an example of an exercise of jur­
isdiction with respect to fishing, “Of the Sea and River 
Fisheries”, R.S.N.B. 1854, c. 101.
31. Proceedings in the North A tlantic Fisheries A rbitration
— Appendix to the case for Great Britain.
32. Treaties and Conventions between the United States and 
other Powers (1889), p. 415.
33. An Act respecting Fishing by Foreign Vessels, 31 Viet. 
(1819), c. 61.
34. D irect United States Cable Co. v. A nglo  Am erican Tele­
graph Co. [1867-77] 2 App. Cas. 394 at p. 421.
35. Lord Hale, D e Jure Maris, C.4.
36. Colombos, op. cit. p. 164 “This rule is subject to the ex­
ception that on historic or prescriptive grounds, or for rea­
sons based on the special characteristics of a bay, the ter­
ritorial state is entitled to claim a wider belt of marginal 
w ater. . .
37. Lauterpacht ed., O ppenheim ’s International Law, Vol. 1 
“Peace”, 7th ed., 1948 p. 458.
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In recent years Canada has been exerting a claim that the 
Gulf of Saint Lawrence is an inland sea.3H It is doubtful, however, 
that if such a claim received recognition under International Law 
it would result in a valid proprietary interest for the adjoining 
provinces.3”
Similarly, bays of between six and twenty-four miles would 
probably be considered as waters accruing “to Canada trom its 
political activities as a sovereign state and the prerogative power 
over external relations” although an argument on behalf of the 
provinces might be advanced that the twenty-four mile limit is 
merely clarification of a disputed rule.40
C. Territorial Sea.
The territorial sea has been succinctly described as a “belt 
of sea adjacent to the coast” .41 The breadth of this belt is subject 
to the discretion of each individual state but clearly an implicit 
sanction is present in the requirement for general acceptance. At 
a minimum, a three-mile limit42 is recognized by Canada.43
However, for purposes of New Brunswick’s argument, it is 
more important to determine whether Great Britain claimed a ter­
ritorial sea in right of the colony of New Brunswick prior to Con­
federation. Establishing that such a contiguous belt was claimed 
by Great Britain for domestic purposes would provide a convinc­
ing prima facie argument but its absence need not be fatal to New 
Brunswick’s case. It is possible that a territorial sea was not recog­
nized for domestic purposes yet was claimed prescriptively or by 
express declaration for any of the colonial possesions.44
38. LaForest, Canadian Inland W aters [1963], C.Y.I.L. 149 at 
p. 170.
39. LaForest, Natural Resources and Public Property under the 
Canadian Constitution, (1969), at p. 90.
40. Ibid.
41. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, Article I, U.N. Doc. A, Conf. 13, L 52. For more 
detailed definitions see O’Connell, p. 524; Colombos, p. 78 
and Lauterpacht, p. 442.
42. Three nautical miles not three statute miles.
43. For example, inter alia see R . v. The Schooner John J. Fal­
len (1916), 55 S.C.R. 348, and for executive recognition 
see Canada’s statement to the International Law Commis­
sion, reproduced in Canada and the United Nations, 1956-
57.
44. Otherwise the British Columbia reference would have been 
confined to the common law situation in Great Britain and 
its careful appraisal of British Columbia history would 
have been redundant.
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Strong support for New Brunswick’s claim to proprietary 
rights in the territorial sea may be found in the concluding words 
of the Royal Commission to Sir Thomas Carleton, including with­
in the boundaries of the province, “all the rights, Members and 
Appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging.”4-' 1 erritorial 
seas have been considered as falling within the general categoriza­
tion of appurtenances in several cases.1'*
A second authority for New Brunswick’s claim to proprietary 
rights in the territorial sea is the existence of a number of pre-con­
federation statutes, some of which were directly approved by the 
British Government. These statutes establish that New Brunswick’s 
boundaries, at least jurisdictionally, prior to Confederation, includ­
ed a territorial sea. For example, in an 1854 interpretation sta­
tute:
“County” shall include City and County; and wherever any 
County or Parish shall be bounded by any Sea, Bay, Gulf or 
River, it shall extend into such Sea, Bay, Gulf or River, to the 
boundary of the Province, or of the adjoining County, running 
out the sidelines thereof in the same manner as if it were land.47
As previously noted, a statute passed in 1819 gave effect to 
a convention signed in 1818 by Great Britain and the United 
States in which Great Britain claimed complete control of fisher­
ies within three miles of harbours, bays, creeks or coasts. This 
“staking out” of jurisdiction, it could be argued, established that 
Great Britain considered the territorial sea as a concomitant of her 
Atlantic colonies and a fortiori included the same in the grant of 
territory to the respective provinces.
Perhaps a more conclusive example of jurisdiction in the ter­
ritorial sea was an 1853 statute enacted by the Legislative As­
sembly of the colony of New Brunswick which stated, inter alia,
Officers of the Provincial Treasury, and any other person duly 
appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council for that pur­
pose, may go on board any vessel or boat within any harbour in 
this Province, or hovering within three marine m iles of any of the 
coasts or harbours thereof, and stay on board so long as she may 
remain within such place or distance.48
This, so called, “hovering” statute, received the direct ap­
proval of British Orders in Council.4”
45. Collections of the New Brunswick Historical Society, op. 
cit., p. 394.
46. The Ship “North" w R. (1906). 37 S.C.R. 385 at n. 401; 
The Grishadarna A rbitration  (1916), Scott Hague Reports 
121, at 127; Anglo-N orw egian Fisheries Case  (1951), I.C.J. 
Rep. 112, at p. 128. As described in footnotes of La For­
est, N atural Resources and Public Property, (1969) p. 101.
47. R.S.N.B. 1854, c. 161 s. 6.
48. S.N.B. 1853, c. 69.
49. Proceedings in the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration pp. 
962-963.
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In 1854 a statute was passed providing that:
The Governor in Council may make regulations for the manage­
ment and protection of the fisheries on the sea coast, or around 
any island of the said coast between low water mark and three
marine m iles . .  .Bo
Beyond the aforementioned statutes, ample Canadian case 
law exists which is generally supportive of a provincial claim. A 
particularly strong representation of this sentiment was expressed 
by Hoyle J. in Anglo-American Telegraph Company v Direct 
United States Cable Company,51 later quoted with approval in 
Rhodes v Fairweather'- and Queen v. Delephine.S3
I hold that the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign extends to 
three miles outside of a line drawn from headland of the b a y . . .  
and that, subject to the royal instructions and the Queen’s power 
of dissent, the Acts of the local legislature have full effect and
operation to the full extent of that territorial jurisdiction.
A seminal authority for the provincial claim is the Provincial 
Fisheries Reference decision where it was held that:
The beds of public harbours not granted before confederation are 
the property of the Dominion of Canada. The beds of all other 
waters not so granted belong to the respective provinces in which 
they are situate, without any distinction between the various 
classes of waters.54
This case was subsequently referred to the Privy Council and 
that body neither endorsed nor dissented from the specific answer 
of the Supreme Court.05 Similarly, in Re Quebec Fisheries™ three 
of four majority judges felt that the territorial sea belonged to the 
provinces but the Privy Council, as in British Columbia Fisheries, 
refused to answer the narrow question of who owned the property 
rights.57
Strong support for the provincial view can be found in dicta 
by Currie J. (dissenting) in Re. Dominion Coal Company Limited 
and County of Cape Breton58 in which he states:
50. R.S.N.B. 1854, c. 101.
51. (1875], 6 Nfld. L.R. 28 at p. 33.
52. (1888) 7 Nfld. L.R. 321.
53. (1889), 7 Nfld. L.R. 378.
54. (1895), 26 S.C.R. 444, quoting from the headnote. The real 
significance of the answer can only be understood in re­
lation to the questions asked. Included, inter alia, was the 
question of who owned the bed of “waters directly and im­
mediately connected with the seacoast and waters not so 
connected”.
55. A -G  of Canada  v A -G  o f Ontario. [1898] A. C. 700.
56. (1917) 35 D.L.R. 1. Q.K.B.
57. A -G  o f Canada v. A -G  o f Quebec, [1921] 1 A.C., 413.
58. (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 593 at p. 620.
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Prior to Confederation, Nova Scotia exercised jurisdiction over an 
area of territorial waters three miles in width measured from its 
coasts, bays and rivers . . .
The strongest authority for New Brunswick’s particular claim 
is the decision per Baxter C. J. in R v Burt,™ subsequently fol­
lowed in Filion v. New Brunswick International Paper Company.co 
In R v. Burt the question, inter alia, was whether the accused fell 
within New Brunswick jurisdiction. He had been apprehended on 
shipboard in the Bay of Fundy, one and three-quarter miles from 
land. It is submitted that the patently clear language of Baxter
C. J., in this case was not done justice by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the British Columbia reference.
In referring to the R v Burt decision, the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated “As in the Conception Bay case, this case did not 
involve a delegation by the British Crown of its rights in the ter­
ritorial sea”.01 It is difficult, taking these remarks in context, to 
clearly understand the court’s reasoning. It might be saying that 
New Brunswick’s jurisdiction in the Bay of Fundy is not an 
authority for territorial sea dominium rights because (a) the Bay of 
Fundy is an inland water as established by boundary,62 or (b) New 
Brunswick has rights in the Bay of Fundy only for purposes of 
“criminal” jurisdiction.63 With respect, it is submitted that the ex­
press wording of Baxter C. J. in R v. Burt precludes either inter­
pretation. He states:
On the grounds, therefore, both of property and jurisdiction, there 
can be no doubt that the Province of New Brunswick included 
the territory within which the offence is alleged to have been 
committed.64
The correct position, it is submitted, is that stated by La For­
est, who, in effect, points out the dual nature of Baxter’s judge­
ment.
Though the Supreme Court of Canada in Re: Offshore M ineral 
R ights o f British Colum bia  refers to the case as one dealing with 
inland waters, the fact is that it was based on both grounds, and 
indeed Chief Justice Baxter appears to have had more confidence 
in the holding that the area in question was within New Bruns­
wick because it was within three miles of the coast.65
59. (1932], 5 M.P.R. 112.
60. (1934), 8 M.P.R. 89 at pp. 118-119.
61. R eference Rc Ownership of Offshore M ineral Rights op. 
cit. pp. 368-369.
62. La Forest’s interpretation of the court’s remarks, N atural 
Resources and Public Property  (1969) at p. 102.
63. Head’s interpretation of the court’s remarks. Ivan L. Head, 
The Canadian O ffshore M inerals Reference 18 University of 
Toronto Law Journal, (1968), 131 at p. 143, foot­
note 60.
64. (1932), 5 M.P.R. 112 at p. 119.
65. La Forest, N atural Resources and Public Property, (1969),
p. 102.
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D. The Continental Shelf.
As defined by the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone,6” the term “continental shelf”67 refers to:
(a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to 
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth 
of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superadjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the na­
tural resources of the said areas;
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adja­
cent to the coasts of islands.
It is difficult, it is submitted, in the face of strongly adverse 
case law and academic treatises to exert a credible claim to sub­
marine resources of the Continental Shelf.68 Any such claim as 
New Brunswick might pursue in this area must, of necessity, have 
as its cornerstone the concluding words of the Letters of Instruc­
tion to Sir Thomas Carleton which included in the specific ter­
ritorial grant “all the Rights, Members and Appurtenances.”69
These concluding words could be of critical importance de­
pending upon which of approximately three theories of proprie­
tary rights in the Continental Shelf are accepted by the court.
The first theory suggests that these submarine areas are not 
capable of appropriation.70 It may be quickly discarded in the face 
of general disapprobation, which, in International Law is the real 
measure of efficacy.
The second theory is that “occupation” forms the basis of 
the claim, the area in question being res nullis until occupied.71 
It may be thought, as per La Forest,72 that examples of pre-con­
federation jurisdiction would satisfy this requirement, but unfor­
tunately, the requirement as stated by Young appears to be more 
exacting.
66. 516 U.N.T.S. 206 Article I.
67. For a discussion of the definitional difficulties involved in 
using this term see Richard Young, The Legal Status o f Sub­
marine Areas Beneath the High Seas, 45 A.J.I.L., (1951), 
225 at p. 227.
68. For example see: M atter o f an arbitration between the Pe­
troleum  D evelopm ent (Trucial C oast) lim ited and his Ex­
cellency Sheikh Shakhit bin Sultan bin Z a’id, Ruler o f A bu  
Dhabi and its Dependencies, (1952)1, 1 Int. and Camp. L.Q. 
247 and Sir Humphrey Waldock The Legal Basis o f  C laim s 
to  the Continental Shelf, (1950), Trans Grotius Society, 115.
69. Collection of the N.B. Historical Society.
70. Young, op cit., p. 229.
71. Young, op. cit. p. 229 and for a fuller discussion see Lau-
terpacnt. Sovereignty O ver Submarine Areas 11950] B.Y.I.L. 
376 at p. 415.
72. La Forest, N atural Resources and Public P roperty , (1969), 
pp. 106-7.
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The familiar modem doctrine is that the occupation of land terri­
tory must be physical and effective . .  .73
Young, however, permits of a variation in his “occupational” 
theory which offers New Brunswick a possible argument. Recog­
nizing a coastal state’s obvious objection to “occupation” by an 
outsider, he suggests that a “notional” occupation theory has been 
developed in which a claim could be staked out by proclamation.74 
It might be argued that the passage quoted from the Letters of 
Instruction would fulfill this proclamatory function.
The most promising theory from New Brunswick’s point of 
view is the contiguous doctrine which regards the continental shelf 
as appurtenant to the adjacent state by an “automatic attribution 
of law and without any requirement of occupation, either real or 
fictitious” .75 The contiguous theory has two distinct strands. One 
suggests an “horizontal prolongation of the already occupied ter­
ritory” while the other speaks in terms of a “physical unity” 
in which the shelf is the base on which the continent rests.76
'It is submitted that if the contiguous theory is accepted, a 
strong argument could be presented that the continenal shelf off 
New Brunswick is, and always was, an appurtenance of the land 
mass, and, as such, was expressly conveyed by the Letters of In­
struction.
The contiguous theory has attracted both academic and judi­
cial support,77 and, it could be argued, the Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf merely gave it practical effect.
Part II. The Effect of The British Columbia Reference
Speculation as to the effect of the British Columbia decision 
must be briefly prefaced by a discussion of the breadth and basis 
of that reference. Narrowing the scope of its ratio decidendi is 
critical to New Brunswick’s argument.
British Columbia joined Confederation in 1871. Her entrance 
had been anticipated by Section 146 of the British North Amer­
ica Act (1967) which provided, inter alia, for joint addresses set­
ting out terms and conditions. The Terms of Union,78 paragraph 
10, extended the provisions of the British North America Act, un­
less otherwise stipulated, to British Columbia.
73. Young, op. cit., p. 230.
74. Young, op. cit, p. 230-1.
75. Young, op. cit, p. 231.
76. Lauterpacht, op. cit. p. 424.
77. A complete discussion of its application, judically and ac­
ademically, is carried in Lauterpacht, op. cit. p. 424-33.
78. This Imperial Order In Council may be found in R.S.B.C. 
1960, Vol. v., 5223-28.
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A fortiori, Section 109 of the British North America Act, 
1867, became applicable to British Columbia and constituted the 
constitutional basis for that province’s claim to offshore mineral 
rights.
The Supreme Court of Canada, after a brief historical distill­
ation, defined the narrow question as “whether the territorial sea 
was within the boundary of the Province of British Columbia at 
the time of Confederation”.70
To assist in resolving this question, the Supreme Court was 
referred to a clutch of cases and statutes having in common only 
their inconclusiveness on the point of issue. Canadian courts had 
invariably confined their decisions, refusing to decide the general 
question. Admittedly, there was no lack of dicta supporting either 
view.80
The authority to which the most weight became attached was 
R v. Keyn,sl supportive of the Dominion position. This litigation 
arose out of a collision between the Franconia, of German regis­
try, and a British ship. The collision occurred in Great Britain’s 
territorial waters”.82 The loss of life of a British subject resulted 
and a jurisdictional question arose as to whether the British courts 
had criminal jurisdiction to try the German officer. The court di­
vided seven to six with one judge having demised before judg­
ment was rendered. The majority denied British courts the right 
to criminal jurisdiction, holding that British territory ended at the 
low water line.
To breach this lacuna in criminal jurisdiction, Great Britain, 
in 1878, passed the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, extending 
the Admiralty Court’s jurisdiction to include foreigners as well as 
British subjects.83
Two cases following R v. Keyn assisted the court in interpre­
ting that decision.84 In both, it was accepted that the realm of 
England ended at the low water line.
79. Reference R e Ownership o f Off-Shore M inerals, p. 360.
80. For example, see statements of Hoyle, J. in A nglo-A m eri­
can Telegraph Co., v. D irect U nited States Cable C o., op. 
cit. supra, and MacDonald J. and Currie J. in R e D om inion  
C oal Co. Ltd. and County o f C ape Breton, op. cit.
81. (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
82. ‘Territorial” is used here in the sense of imperium  rather 
than dom inium .
83. 41-42 Viet. (1878), c. 73.
84. H arris v Owners o f Franconia [1877], 2 C.P.D. 173 and 
B lackpool P ier C om pany  v F ylde Union  [1877] 36 L.T. 
251.
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A plethora of other cases and statutes of both Canadian and 
British origin were distinguished as being of specific application 
and not of such scope as to constitute an authority for provincial 
jurisdiction.85
In summary, the Supreme Court found that the British Crown 
did not confer upon British Columbia proprietary rights in the 
territorial sea prior to Confederation and such rights were never 
received by British Columbia after Confederation as part of a 
boundary extension. Ex hypothesi, it was found that these rights 
were held inchoate by Great Britain in right of Canada and were 
assumed by the Dominion at an undetermined time between 1871 
and 1967, more specifically between 1919 and 1931.80
The Dominion’s capacity to assume jurisdiction over the ter­
ritorial seas was found in several disparate constitutional princi­
ples. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in this regard is of sufficient 
importance to be reproduced in detail.
The sovereign State which has the property in the bed of the ter­
ritorial sea adjacent to British Columbia is Canada. At no time 
has British Columbia, either as a Colony or a Province, had pro­
perty in these lands. It is the sovereign State of Canada that has 
the right, as between Canada and British Columbia, to explore 
and exploit these lands, and Canada has exclusive legislative jur­
isdiction in respect of them either under s. 91 (1A) [am. 1949 (U.
K.), c. 81, s. 1] of the B.N.A. Act or under the residual power 
in s. 91 British Columbia has no legislative jurisdiction since the 
lands in question are outside its boundaries. The lands under the 
territorial sea do not fall within any of the enumerated heads of 
s. 92 since they are not within the Province.
Legislative jurisdiction with respect to such lands must, therefore, 
belong exclusively to Canada, for the subject-matter is one not 
coming within the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the 
Legislatures of the Provinces within the meaning of the initial 
words of s. 91 and may, therefore, properly be regarded as a 
matter affecting Canada generally and covered by the expression 
“the peace, order, and good government of Canada.”
The mineral resources of the lands underlying the territorial sea 
are of concern to Canada as a whole and go beyond local or 
provincial concern or interests.
Moreover, the rights in the territorial sea arise by international 
law and depend upon recognition by other sovereign States. Leg­
islative jurisdiction in relation to the lands in question belongs to 
Canada which is a sovereign State recognized by international law 
and thus able to enter into arrangements with other States re­
specting the rights in the territorial sea.
85. A  complete discussion of this material may be found in 
La Forest, op. cit., pp. 92-100 and Neil Caplan, Legal Is­
sues of the O ffshore M ineral Rights D ispu te in Canada,
14 McGill Law Journal, (1968), 475.
86. Reference R e Ownership of Offshore M ineral Rights, at p.
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Canada is a signatory to the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone any may become a party to other interna­
tional treaties and conventions affecting rights in the territorial 
sea.87
It is contended that, in the context of the court’s reasoning 
throughout, it is absolutely crucial, for this decision to be properly 
understood, to recognize that a condition precedent to the ratio 
decidendi was the failure of the Province of British Columbia to 
establish that the locus in quo was within its confines at the time 
of Confederation. With the utmost respect to a commonly held 
contrary view,88 it is submitted that any other interpretation would 
be incompatible with firmly established patterns of constitutional 
interpretation and would be incompatible with an underlying pre­
mise that may be discerned from a careful examination of the in­
stant case.
In paragraph one of the quote, the Supreme Court was ex­
tremely careful to note that the locus in dispute did not fall with­
in any of the enumerated heads of section 92 and proceeded to sug­
gest that sections 91 (1A) or the residual power of section 91 sup­
ported the federal claim.
The first category, it might be argued, is mere spurious win­
dow dressing. Section 91 (1A) makes the public debt and property 
a Dominion jurisdiction. It is not of assistance in bringing off­
shore minerals from outside constitutional jurisdiction to within 
Dominion powers. It merely provides a convenient peg on which 
to hang the subjcct matter after the “working” components of the 
constitution have done the job of establishing jurisdiction.89 With 
respect to offshore mineral rights, section 91 (1A) may be used 
concomitant with, but not independent of, other sources of fed­
eral power. In syllogistic terms, it could be constructed: (a) Off­
shore minerals are public property, (b) Public property under sec­
tion 91 (1A) is under federal jurisdiction, (c) Ergo, offshore min­
erals come under federal jurisdiction.
87. Ibid. pp. 375-76.
88. See, for example, H. Albert Hubbard, Ownership o f and  
jurisdiction over Offshore M ineral Rights, (1967), 2 Ottawa 
Law Review, (1967), Vol. 2, pp. 218-19. R eport o f the 
Special Joint C om m ittee on the Constitution o f Canada,
p 66, which staled thst ‘'there is nothing in the result pecu­
liar to the Province of British Columbia”; and Martha Flet­
cher, Judical R eview  and the D ivision o f Powers in C an­
ada, eJ. J. Peîer Meekison, Canadian Federalism: Myth of 
Reiility, 140, at p. 151.
89. The term “working” components refer to heads such as 
Trade and Commerce, Property and Civil Rights, the de­
claratory power, and the “peace, order, and good govern­
ment” clause.
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Unfortunately, the logical breakdown begins with the major 
premise. The question of whether offshore minerals are public 
property is exactly the question to be determined.
The “working” component in this case is the residual power 
clause. It has been suggested by one authority that:
Another noteworthy feature of this opinion is the apparent find­
ing that Parliament has exclusive authority in relation to the off­
shore territories as a matter of national concern and regardless 
of whether the territory is within provincial boundaries.90
It is submitted, most respectfully, that this interpretation is 
categorically incorrect and its malapropos flows logically from fail­
ing to recognize the crucial importance of the condition precedent. 
Its inaccuracy is manifest from the precise wording of the second 
paragraph, supra, “ . .  . for the subject matter is one not coming 
within the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the Legisla­
ture of the provinces within the meaning of the initial words of 
section 91 and may, therefore . . . ”
Section 3 of the British North America Act, 1871, states:
The Parliament of Canada may from time to time, with the con­
sent of the Legislature of any Province of the said Dominion, in­
crease, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of such province, 
upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed to by the said 
Legislature, and may, with the like consent, make provision re­
specting the effect and operation of any such increase or diminu­
tion or alteration of territory in relation to any Province affected 
thereby.1'1
If the Dominion government were to claim offshore territor­
ies, which had been established to be within provincial boundaries, 
it would be a blatant or colourable contravention of section 3 
which, in its requirement for provincial consent for boundary al­
terations, provides a precedural limitation on Federal authority 
that can only be abrogated by constitutional amendment.
Quite clearly the British Columbia reference employed an 
expansive interpretation of the residual power clause, undoubtedly 
following Munro v. National Capital Commission,9- which in turn 
employed the test of which the Canada Tcmperance Federation™ 
case was the harbinger.
. . .  the true test must be found in the real subject matter of the 
legislation: if it is such that it goes beyond local or provincial 
concern or interests and must from its inherent nature be the 
concern of the Dominion as a w hole. . .  then it will fall within 
the competence of the Dominion Parliament.
90. Hubbard, op. cit. p. 218-19.
91. 34-35 Viet c. 28, s. 3.
92. (1966), 57. D.L.R. (2d) 753.
93. A -G  of Ont. v Canada Tem perance Federation  [1946] A. 
C. 193.
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Even employing this liberal interpretation of the residuary 
power clause, it is submitted that the Supreme Court would be 
loath to establish that this repository of Dominion power could 
be employed to affect provincial boundaries - in the face of Sec­
tion 3 of the British North America Act, requiring provincial con­
sent. In the absence of express language stating such a proposi­
tion, a narrower construction should be applied, i.e. the condition 
precedent theory.
The Supreme Court also postulated that Dominion jurisdic­
tion could be found in the treaty power.1,4 In the absence of speci­
fic contextual remarks, this aspect of the court’s decision is ex­
tremely difficult to evaluate. The language of the court was crit­
ically described by Professor Head as “shocking” :
. . .  But the Court did not stop there. It continued on for three 
further sentences which are so shocking in their impact, so far- 
reaching in their consequences and so totally out of keeping with 
the tone of the opinion to that point that one can only assume 
that the Court was not cognizant of what it was saying. . .  It is 
submitted, with respect, that the Supreme Court has erred, and it 
has done so because it failed to appreciate that “the Crown in right 
of Canada” vis-a-vis other nation-states in the international com­
munity is a different legal entity from “the Crown in right of 
Canada” vis-a-vis the provinces in the federal community.95
It seems highly unlikely that, without a wide ranging discus­
sion, including explicit representations by the respective counsels, 
the court would radically deviate from the long established La­
bour Convention1)6 decision.
An alternative explanation is available, similarly based upon 
the condition precedent theory.
In their decision, the judges saw that they could resolve the issue 
without being forced to either overrule or endorse the L abour 
C onventions decision. Because, and only because the disputed 
areas were found to be outside the boundaries of British Colum­
bia, no such pronouncement was needed.97
The purpose of this wide ranging discussion of the ratio 
decidendi was to establish that the superstructure of the courts’ 
reasoning is only applicable where the province« are unable to 
to prove their jurisdiction. If this condition precedent theory has 
not been established, New Brunswick’s argument suffers a fatal 
flaw, ab origine.
94. Reference R e Ownership of Off-Shore M inerals p. 376. 
376.
95. Head, op. cit. at 147 and at p. 155.
96. A -G  Canada v A -G  Ontario  [1937] A.C. 326.
97. Caplan, op. cit., at p. 491.
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Considered in this perspective, the effect of the British Col­
umbia decision is to weaken, but not destroy, the arguments of an­
other province marshalling different historical references. In the 
shadow of the British Columbia decision, New Brunswick’s claim 
still thrives but with perceptibly less vigour.
Part III: Conclusion
A. Foreshore
With respect to this locus, there can be little doubt that vis- 
a-vis the Dominion, New Brunswick has an unimpugned claim to 
whatever may lie under the solum.
B. Inland Waters
In similarity with the previous category, this specific item was 
not raised in the British Columbia reference. It was included in 
this study for the practical reason that it subsumes the bulk of 
New Brunswick’s adjacent waters. The most contentious feature of 
this category in any legal proceeding is likely to be a precise de­
limitation of the territory involved.
C. The Territorial Sea
In contrast to the previous categories, the territorial sea is 
distinctly “fighting” ground. It is here that the British Columbia 
decision has its most debilitating effect on New Brunswick’s 
argument. In the absence of the British Columbia reference, 
New Brunswick could include, as part of its argumentation, 
the common law position prior to 1867. It is a commonplace 
in learned articles on this case that the decision was not logically 
dictated by common law98 and that public policy considerations 
underlined the court’s reasoning."
However, the British Columbia decision effectively deter­
mined this common law question and New Brunswick cannot rely 
upon arguments of British domestic jurisdiction prior to 1867.
98. See for example, Hubbard, op. cit., p. 213. See also Charles 
Birt, W ho owns the M ineral Rights in H udson’s B ay , 3 Man­
itoba Law Journal (1969), 41 at p. 49. Birt points out 
that the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, pass­
ed to remedy the jurisdictional deficiency created by R. v. 
Kexn. included in its preamble a statement that. . .  rightful 
jurisdiction of Her M ajesty. . .  extends and always extend­
ed over the open seas adjacent to the coasts of the United 
Kingdom and of all other parts of Her Majesty’s Domin­
ions . . . ”. He concludes at p. 51 that the Supreme Court was 
incorrect in its assessment of the common law position.
99. Caplan, op. cit., p. 475.
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In this context, the condition precedent theory is vital to New 
Brunswick’s argument. Even here the New Brunswick case has 
been undermined. A spinoff effect of the British Columbia refer­
ence was to clearly impugn some of the statutes and cases upon 
which New Brunswick must rely to prove her claim.
The Supreme Court in the British Columbia reference seem­
ed genuinely reluctant to find “public law consequences in pri­
vate law circumstances” .101' There is no reason to anticipate a 
change in attitude.
D. The Continental Shelf
New Brunswick has a decidedly disadvantageous position 
with respect to this “fighting” ground. The theory most favorable 
to New Brunswick’s claim - the contiguous theory - by its very 
essence should also have been applicable to British Columbia. 
New Brunswick’s only claims to distinction are several isolated ex­
amples of prescriptive jurisdiction and a territorial grant which 
includes the word “appurtenances” . Furthermore, a finding that 
the territorial sea was outside New Brunswick’s boundaries would, 
a priori, apply to the Continental Shelf.
It would be trite logic to suggest that the British Columbia 
decision is only a reference and does not apply to  New Bruns­
wick.101 The rare unanimity of the court gives the lie to such sop­
histry.102 If, as has been argued by a number of authorities, the 
court’s reasoning was underlined by a “practical policy” approach, 
there is no reason to suspect that these policy considerations have 
changed. Although New Brunswick’s position is considerably 
stronger than British Columbia’s position was, a truly formidable 
argument would have to be available to defeat what, practically 
speaking, amounts to a Dominion presumption.
In strictly utilitarian terms, New Brunswick’s interest would 
probably be best served through a political settlement. The fed­
eral government is under considerable pressure to resolve the is­
sue through a bi-lateral political arrangement. The Premier of 
Nova Scotia, it has been suggested, would object in the strongest 
possible terms if the federal government were to raise the issue be­
fore the Supreme Court of Canada. Such an attack would revive 
the bitter animosity of the mid-sixties. This sentiment was high­
lighted by Premier Lesage’s threat not to recognize the Supreme
100. Head, op. cit., 131 at p. 144.
101. As per Premier W.A.C. Bennett, reported in an editorial, 
The H alifax Chronicle H erald, July 1, 1972, p. 6.
102. Only ten constitutional cases decided between 1950 and 
1965 have been unanimous. See Stephen R. Mitchell, The 
Supreme C ourt o f Canada since the A bolition  of A ppeals  
to the Judical C om m ittee  o f  the P rivy Council: A Quan­
tita tive A nalysis, unpublished.
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Court’s offshore decision and was manifest in repeated demands 
for a constitutional court.103 The leverage has been increased by 
joining Quebec in the loose coalition of Atlantic Provinces’ Pre­
miers, formed for the purpose of presenting a strong united 
stand.104
In the face of this concerted opposition, the Dominion gov­
ernment has considerably relaxed its original fifty-fifty revenue 
sharing proposal.
A recently mooted federal proposal calls for fifty per cent 
to be distributed to the province off whose coast the revenue is 
derived, thirty per cent to be retained by the federal government 
and twenty per cent to be distributed in a regional pool. Paradoxi­
cally, New Brunswick, because of its limited offshore territory, 
may derive a greater net benefit from a formula of this nature than 
from a legal decision awarding all of the offshore area to the pro­
vince.
Furthermore, New Brunswick has a very large area of ad­
jacent inland waters which clearly lie outside the provisions of the 
revenue sharing formula. Consequently, New Brunswick would not 
be required to share revenue from this source. In this context it 
seems obvious that the disposition most advantageous to New 
Brunswick would be a political settlement with a “regional pool” 
feature.
103. J. Lyon and R. Atkcy, Canadian C onstitutional Law  In a 
M odern Perspective, (1970), p. 350.
104. Meeting of Premiers held in June 1972, as a follow up to 
a meeting of Mines Ministers of the five provinces held in 
May, 1972.
